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CURRENTOPINION Costs and benefits of realism and optimism
Lisa Bortolotti and Magdalena Antrobus
Purpose of review
What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature
on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism, it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about
the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically
adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about the style of
thinking and mental health.
Recent findings
Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in
tasks involving time perception and estimates of personal circumstances, but not in other tasks. Unrealistic
optimism remains a robust phenomenon across a variety of tasks and domains, and researchers are
starting to explore its neural bases. However, the challenge is to determine to what extent and in what way
unrealistic optimism is beneficial.
Summary
We should revisit the hypothesis that optimistic cognitions are psychologically adaptive, whereas realistic
thinking is not. Realistic beliefs and expectations can be conducive to wellbeing and good functioning, and
wildly optimistic cognitions have considerable psychological costs.
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INTRODUCTION
Do accurate cognitions make us happy? It would
seem not. Compare unrealistic optimism [1] and
depressive realism [2]. Depressive realism tells us
that people with depression make more accurate
judgements and realistic predictions than people
without depression. For instance, when asked to
assess their own performance in a novel task and in
the absence of feedback, people with depression are
more likely to assess their performance accurately
than controls. Unrealistic optimism tells us that
predictions made by people in a nonclinical sample
are more optimistic than is objectively warranted by
the evidence. For instance, when people think about
the future, they tend to underestimate their chances
of developing cancer or getting a divorce.
When depressive realism and unrealistic opti-
mism are examined together (see Refs. [3] and [4]),
several questions emerge. Are the psychological
benefits of optimistic predictions brought about
by their inaccuracy? Are people with depression
sadder but wiser than people without depression?
In the last couple of years, these issues have been
addressed in a significant number of new empirical
studies and literature reviews. In the emerging pic-
ture is the one in which the meaning of depressive
realism and unrealistic optimism is shifting and
their scope is being refined. The view that there is
a trade-off between truth and wellbeing, in which
obtaining wellbeing depends on distorting the
truth, is revealed as too simplistic.
DEPRESSIVE REALISM: TRUTH OR
FICTION?
The phenomenon of depressive realism faces a
multitude of challenges. The phenomenon was
originally described in terms of precision in assess-
ing one’s own control over processes that could
not be controlled [2], but since then depressive
realism has been stretched to include accuracy in
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completing such diverse tasks as making financial
decisions for others [5], perceiving the nature of the
interaction in personal relationships [6&] and even
forecasting the results of sport games [7&]. With the
exception of the prediction of events that are not
self-related, the phenomenon of depressive realism
has been confirmed by recent research. People diag-
nosed with mild or moderate depressionmake more
accurate judgments in a variety of domains. The
most striking evidence comes from the studies based
on people’s real-life experiences.
People with depression often report feeling mis-
understood by the closest members of their families.
This, in turn, may lead to increased feelings of lone-
liness and intensify depressive symptoms. It appears
that people who are experiencing light or moderate
depressive symptoms report perceiving their part-
ners as less able to understand their thoughts and
feelings [6&]. Such perception is not the manifes-
tation of a general negativity associated with depres-
sion, it turns out to be accurate.Without realizing it,
partners of people with depression are less under-
standing than partners of people without depres-
sion. For instance, they lack empathic accuracy, that
is, they do not correctly identify which emotions are
felt by the person with depression in a conversation
involving conflict.
Depression also seems to be closely related to a
conscious awareness of the symptoms of one’s own
long-term condition. In an investigation of the
relation between anosognosia (defined as lack of
awareness about deficits associated with an illness
or about the illness itself) and mood in Alzheimer’s
disease [8&], anosognosia appeared to be negatively
associated with depression: the more awareness
people have of their disease, the more depressed
they are. Although the nature of this association
has not been explained, one can speculate that
depression increases one’s ability for realistic
insight. The hypothesis is compatible with the
results of another study, in which participants with
depression seem to have better conscious access to
another type of knowledge, obtained via visual stat-
istical learning [9]. Depressive mood is induced in
randomly selected participants by having them
listen to a sad story. Participants are then asked
to complete a visual statistical learning task.
Depressivemood (whose intensity ismeasured using
a clinical scale) does not seem to have a significant
effect on the process of learning itself, but it affects
the individual awareness of what has been learnt.
This result is compatible with the hypothesis that
better accuracy is related to cognitive insight into
depression and could be explained by attention
having a narrower focus and negative affect eliciting
an analytic reasoning style [9].
A study on depressive realism and time percep-
tion [10&&] investigates the effects of mild depression
(measured by clinical scales) on time estimation
and production, understood as assessing and gener-
ating time intervals of a particular duration. The
results confirm depressive realism: whereas people
with mild depression are accurate in estimating
perceived and produced time, controls overesti-
mate perceived time and underestimate produced
time. This study suggests that people with mild
depression perceive time more accurately than con-
trols.
Can there be mediating factors in the depressive
realism effect? One area in which this question has
been examined is the accuracy in identifying uncon-
trollable situations [11]. The design of the experi-
ment resembles the original study by Alloy and
Abramson [2]. Participants are asked to estimate
their control over a flashing light on the computer
screen. The results seem to provide further support
for the depressive realism phenomenon, suggesting
that people in a depressive mood (measured accord-
ing to the clinical scale) do not overestimate their
control over independent events. However, in this
case, the results can be explained by participants in a
depressive mood being more passive or hesitant
in exhibiting their reactions. When this factor is
KEY POINTS
! Recent psychological literature on the phenomena of
depressive realism and unrealistic optimism raises
doubts for the claim that overly optimistic beliefs and
predictions contribute to mental health, whereas
realistic judgements lead to decreased wellbeing.
! Depressive realism is observed in time perception and
in estimates of self-related circumstances, but it does not
seem to extend to the prediction of random future
events and to estimates of states of affairs concerning
other people.
! Realism can be detrimental in some contexts
(e.g., causing concern for the possibility of future
negative events) and beneficial in other contexts
(e.g., leading to better adjustment to a degenerative
disorder).
! The phenomenon of unrealistic optimism has been
confirmed and some preliminary investigations of its
neural bases have been attempted.
! Although optimism seems to have positive outcomes,
the type of benefit needs to be qualified and it is
possible for one type of benefit to be accompanied by
a cost of another type (e.g., a risk-taking behaviour
motivated by optimism can at the same time decrease
anxiety and inhibit preventive measures).
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manipulated, the accuracy in the task is no longer
mood dependent. Thus, the study leads us to con-
clude that realism is not actually linked to depres-
sion as a general mood disorder, but to co-existing
factors such as, in this case, the level of cognitive
activity.
The depressive realism effect is less clear or
completely insignificant in studies centered on
the prediction of future events, especially when
the prediction is about circumstances concerning
other people and not the self. Participants with
depressive symptoms predict the results of football
matches [7&] less accurately than people with no
depressive symptoms. This suggests that depression
does not help forecast future events that are not self-
related. How does depression affect self–other dis-
crepancies in decision making? Participants with
depression asked to read a variety of scenarios before
making their own predictions and decisions [5] are
less prone to optimistic bias when predicting other
people’s decisions than participants without depres-
sion. However, the depressive realism effect is not
evident when participants make decisions for other
people. This result suggests that depressionmight be
associated with increased sensitivity to social threats
rather than with a general negative bias in cognitive
functioning.
UNREALISTIC OPTIMISM: GOOD OR BAD?
The psychological literature has used inconsistent
terminology when describing the phenomenon of
unrealistic optimism, and this helps explain appa-
rently conflicting experimental results [12&&]. First,
researchers have largely ignored the distinction
between absolute optimism (the erroneous belief
that personal negative outcomes are less likely to
occur than objectively warranted) and comparative
optimism (the erroneous belief that personal risks
are lower than those of other people or lower than
average). Second, researchers have tended to con-
flate claims about biological adaptiveness (success in
survival and reproduction), psychological adaptive-
ness (wellbeing and good functioning), and other
forms of successful engagement with the physical
and social environment.
‘Unrealistic optimism’ has become an umbrella
term that covers a number of different phenomena.
In the better than average effect [13], people believe
that they aremore virtuous,more talented andmore
compassionate than others, and less prone to error.
In illusions of self-control [14], people believe that
they can control events that are not under their
control, especially when they are personally
involved in the events [15]. In ‘overoptimism’ or
the optimistic bias [16], people believe that they are
less likely to experience future negative outcomes,
such as being involved in a car accident or contract-
ing a serious disease, than it is objectivelywarranted.
In illusions of superiority, people overrate their own
performance relative toothers in a variety of domains
[17]. Ingeneral, people areaffectedbyapositivitybias
(self-enhancement and self-protection) and have
overly flattering conceptions of themselves that are
also resistant to negative feedback [14].
By and large, the literature accepts that unreal-
istic optimism is a real phenomenon. A plausible
story about its neurobiology is becoming available,
thanks to the new studies about the role of dopa-
mine and vestibular stimulation in enhancing or
inhibiting unrealistic optimism (see for instance
Refs. [18,19,20&&,21]). However, the claim that
optimistic thinking leads to increased wellbeing,
better functioning or enhanced health is often chal-
lenged [22]. In conditions of uncertainty and risk,
some instances of optimism lead people to make
better decisions by helping avoid more costly mis-
takes and contribute to survival and flourishing,
bringing both cognitive and evolutionary advan-
tages [23]. For instance, a study found that people
with narcissism outperform controls in making de-
cisions when they need to forego an immediate
reward for a future benefit, ignoring misleading
information [24]. Overconfidence provides status
benefits even when one’s actual ability is revealed
to others: people are not socially sanctioned for their
overconfidence [25].
However, optimism has drawbacks as well, and
these are being increasingly examined in the psycho-
logical literature. Here are two examples, the first
concerning health and the second concerning suc-
cess in romantic relationships. Unrealistic optimism
about health prospects can have immediate psycho-
logical benefits, as people are less worried about their
future if they think that they are unlikely to suffer
from a disease. But there are also significantly bad
consequences when people underestimate the risk of
suffering from a certain condition and fail to adopt
preventivemeasures thatwould improve their health
prospects [12&&]. For instance, the belief that one is at
low risk of negative outcomes leads to bad decisions
that may have serious implications, such as the
decision to continue smoking due to the belief that
one is unlikely to suffer from lung cancer or the
decision not to use contraception due to the belief
that one is unlikely to contract sexually transmitted
diseases [16]. Although a positive outlook generally
supports the wellbeing of people affected by serious
conditions and predicts more successful therapeutic
interventions, realistic attitudes to chronic degener-
ative conditions seem to be more beneficial than
optimistic ones [26&].
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Traditionally, optimism has been regarded as
beneficial in ensuring the success of romantic
relationships, because the optimistic biases that
apply to the self are often extended to romantic
partners who are thought to be more attractive,
intelligent and talented than they actually are (this
effect is sometimes called the love-is-blind bias).
And when people have a rosy view of how attractive
and talented their partners are, they are more likely
to enjoy a satisfying and lasting relationship [27].
However, positive illusions have also been found to
generate negative relational outcomes. For instance,
the love-is-blind bias seems to be correlated with
anxious jealousy, that is, the tendency to imagine a
partner’s infidelity and ruminate about it, experi-
encing negative feelings as a result [28]. And
although a general disposition towards optimism
leads to the adoption of more constructive
approaches when difficulties in the relationship
emerge, having excessively optimistic expectations
about a relationship can lead to disappointment and
emotional distress in situations of conflict [29&].
CONCLUSION
The broad thesis supported by the classic psycho-
logical literature on realism and optimism seems to
be confirmed by the recent studies: people with
depression are able to make more accurate judg-
ments and more realistic predictions in some con-
texts, and nonclinical samples have overly
optimistic beliefs about themselves and their own
future prospects.
But some qualifications are in order. The studies
we have reviewed adopted different methodologies
and relied on different construals of depressive real-
ism and unrealistic optimism, and in some studies
the sample of participants was very small. Future
research is needed to replicate the findings in more
natural settings with bigger samples and different
populations. On the basis of the recent psychologi-
cal literature, it is justified to believe that depressive
realism is a real phenomenon that applies to self-
related information as opposed to other-related
information, and to estimates of present circum-
stances as opposed to predictions of the future. In
sum, the assessment of people with depression is
more accurate (compared to that of control groups)
when the assessment concerns one’s own, rather
than another’s, situation: one’s relationships, state
of health, knowledge and control over external
events. The effect seems insignificant when esti-
mates relate to self-detached processes of guessing,
forecasting the future, as well as making decisions
that might be of practical importance for other
people. Similarly, inconsistent results about
unrealistic optimism may be obtained if different
forms of optimism are conflated and for this reason
it is important to acknowledge that the phenom-
enon of optimism comprises a number of distinct
illusions and biases, each of which deserves inde-
pendent in-depth analysis. Optimism is confirmed
in areas such as predictions of future health, and
evaluations of the positive features (attractiveness,
moral character and talents) of oneself and of one’s
romantic partner.
As initially hypothesized, realistic beliefs and
predictions about the self are thought to have an
adverse effect on wellbeing and functioning, and
optimistic ones are shown to be psychologically
adaptive in some circumstances. For instance, differ-
ently from healthy controls, people with major
depressive disorder show no optimistic bias when
they update their beliefs about the likelihood of an
unpleasant life event happening to them in the light
of relevant statistical information [3]. That suggests
that positive illusions may contribute to mental
health. However, a blanket recommendation to give
in to optimism does not guarantee happiness, suc-
cess or mental health. Excessive optimism can
become problematic and lead to poor strategic
planning, disillusionment and disappointment,
and risky behaviours.
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